Nicky hager og undersøgende journalistik.

En lille gennemgang af Nicky Hager om hvordan han skrev bogen the secret power.

Don’t assume that secretive organisations are impenetrable

Many people have asked how I uncovered information about Echelon. They are experiences I think are worth sharing. The starting point for my research was finding out the names and job titles of all the staff within the New Zealand electronic intelligence agency. The breakthrough came when I realised that all their names had been hidden within public service staff lists, scattered through pages and pages of military staff. Because hardly anyone knew even of the organisation’s existence, they presumably thought the names would never be noticed.

By obtaining other lists of military staff that were compiled without the spies, and subtracting one list from the other, I was left with a near-perfect list of the hundreds of people inside the spy agency; and many more who had worked there in the past. Comparing this list to other public service lists gave me general job titles for all these people. Combined with some early leaks, I was gradually able to construct the entire top-secret organisational plan from relatively open sources. The job then began of identifying people in the various sections willing to talk.

People have varied reasons for deciding to leak information. There is, for instance, simply the relief of talking to someone who knows about their work after years of never being able to tell even their wives or husbands what they have done at work all day. But the main reason in this case was the officers’ concerns that an important area of government activity had been too secret for too long, both from the public and Parliament. Some people felt strongly about intelligence activities they regarded as immoral or not in the country’s interests. I decided who might be willing to talk to me, seeking people from all the various compartmentalised sections I wanted to study, and then quietly approached them. I am still surprised that most of the people I approached were prepared to talk to me, resulting in hundreds of pages of interview notes about the high-tech spy systems they operate.

Once the information had started, it poured in. It became known within the spy agencies that I was reearching them – new staff were warned about me in security briefings although they had no idea how much I had learnt or that I was writing a book – but, if anything, this seemed to help the leaks. For a long time I felt a slight thrill when I put my hand in my postbox in case I found secret papers left anonymously inside.

Some information came because ‘high security’ can be more about impressions than reality. For example, the spy bosses must surely have wondered why I repeatedly requested the latest copies of the agency’s internal newsletters, when they always released them with every meanful word blacked out. These people are our government’s chief advisors on security issues, but what they never realised was that by holding the photocopied newsletters up to my desk light I could, with care, read virtually everything – all the details of new or refocussed sections, staff changes, overseas postings and so on – that had been deleted.

High security at the agency’s most secret spying facility, the Waihopai station, was also more impression than reality. Despite electric fences, sensors and razor wire, I went there several times while writing the book and later was able to take a television documentary crew inside, where they filmed the Echelon equipment in the main operations room and even the titles of Intelsat (International Satellite Organisation) manuals on the desks (which confirmed the facility’s role spying on ordinary public telecommunications networks).

While there was very secret information I could only learn from insiders, a lot of the information came from careful fieldwork (such as observing changes over the years in various Echelon stations around the world as telecommunications technology changed) and collating snippets of information from unclassified documents and news reports. Various of the inside sources were friends of friends of friends who I located simply by asking around widely. Don’t assume that secretive organisations are impenetrable. There is important research work waiting to be done on many subjects in every country.